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The Deeper Challenges
of Global Terrorism:
A Democratizing Response
Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss1

Answering the terrorist challenge
The audacious and gruesome terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, along with the military response , have
been the defining political events of this new millennium. The
most profound challenge directed at the international community, and to all of us, is to choose between two alternative
visions. What we call the traditional statist response emphasizes
'national security' as the cornerstone of human security. Centralization of domestic authority, secrecy, militarism, nationalism ,
and an emphasis on unconditional citizen loyalty, to her or his
state as the primary organizing feature of international politics
are all attributes of this approach.
We recommend an alternative vision, one that we call democratic
transnationalism. Democratic transnationalism attempts to draw
on the successes of democratic, particularly multinational democratic, domestic orders as a model for achieving human security
in the international sphere. This approach calls for the resolution
of political conflict through an open transnational citizen/societal
(rather than state or market) centred political process legitimized
by fairness, adherence to human rights, the rule of law, and
representative community participation. The promotion of security for individuals and groups through international human rights
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law in general, as reinforced by the incipient international criminal
court with its stress on an ethos of individual legal responsibility,
assessed within a reliable constitutional setting, is a crucial element
of this democratic transnationalist vision, which aspires to achieve
a cosmopolitan reach.
Before the events of September 11 we had argued in favour of
the establishment of a distinct, global institutional voice for the
peoples of the world as a beneficial next step to be taken to carry
forward the transnational democratic project. We proposed a
GPA, which we have variously identified as a Global Parliamentary
Assembly, and interchangeably as a Global Peoples' Assembly.2 So
far we have deliberately refrained from setting forth a detailed
blueprint of our proposal, partly to encourage a wide debate
about the general idea, partly to generate a sense of democratic
participation in the process of establishing such a populist institution. We have expressed a tentative preference for representation on a basis that would to the extent possible incorporate the
principle of one person one vote. The eventual goal would be to
enfranchise as voting constituents all citizens of the planet above
a certain age. We have further taken the position that the CPA
should not interfere in matters appropriately defined as within
'the internal affairs of states', although acknowledging that the
extent of such deference is bound to shift through time and often
be controversial in concrete instances. The main mission of the
GPA would be to playa role in democratizing the formulation
and implementation of global policy. It is our conviction that
such an assembly's powers should always be exercised in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other
widely accepted international human rights instruments.
We believe that carrying out the transnational democratic
project, including establishing the CPA, should be treated as part
of the political response to the challenges posed by the sort of
mega-terrorism associated with the September 11 attacks. Transnational terrorism, which consists of networks of dedicated
extremists organized across many borders, of which al Qaeda is
exemplary, is so constituted that its grievances, goals, recruitment
tactics and membership, as well as its objects of attack, are all
wholly transnational. This form of political violence is a new
phenomenon. It is the frightfully dark side of an otherwise mostly
promising trend toward the t.ransnationalization of politics. This
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lrend, a result of economic and cultural globalization, has manifested itself in a pronounced way since the street demonstrations
staged against the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle.
The state-centric structures of the international system are not
adequate to address this new transnational societal activism and,
in fact, the arbitrary territorial constraints on the organization of
work and life have intensified various forms of frustration, which
feed the rise of transnational terrorism. One cause of this frustration is that globalization in all its dimensions is bringing witl1
it changes of great magnitude that often directly impact on the
lives of individuals and regions. These changes range from growing income inequality within and between many societies to
powerful assaults on cultural traditions that offend non-Western
peoples. Adverse impacts of globalization on many adherents of
Islam have definitely induced political extremism in recent decades even before September 11 , starting with the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s.
Even in democratic societies there is a growing sense that
domestic politics is not capable of responding creatively to longrange challenges of regional and global scope. It is certainly the
case that the magnitude of these challenges is well beyond the
capacities of even the strongest of states to shape benevolently on
their own. At the same time individuals have an ever-greater
incentive to influence global decision-making through their use
of the technologies of globalization, especially the Internet. Information technology has given individuals an unprecedented ability
to increase their leverage on public issues by making common
cause with like-minded others without regard to considerations of
geography or nationality.
An institutional framework such as that which would be provided by a CPA is a democratic way to begin peacefully to
accommodate this new internationalization of civic politics. Individuals and groups could channel their frustrations into efforts to
attempt to participate in and influence parliamentary decisionmaking as they have become accustomed to doing in the more
democratic societies of the world. Presently, with trivial exceptions, individuals, groups and their associations are denied an
official role in global political institutions where decision-making
is dominated by elites who have been officially designated by
states. Intergovernmental organizations, such as the United
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Nations, the World Trade Organization and the International
Monetary Fund are run as exclusive membership organizations,
operated by and for states. With the possibility of direct and
formalized participation in the international system foreclosed,
frustrated individuals and groups (especially when their own
governments are viewed as illegitimate or host.ile) have been
turning to various modes of civic resistance, both peaceful and
violent. Global terrorism is at the violent end of this spectrum of
transnational protest, and its apparent agenda may be mainly
driven by religious, ideological and regional goals rather than by
resistance directly linked to globalization. But its extremist alienation is partly, at the very least, an indirect result of globalizing
impacts that may be transmuted in the political unconscious of
those so afflicted into grievances associated with cultural
injustices.
In addition to helping provide a non-violent and democralic
channel for frustrated individuals and groups to affect meaningfully global decision-making, a GPA has the potential to provide a
way of helping to resolve inter-societal and more recently intercivilizational conflict and polarization. Presen tly, the institutions
around which citizen politics is formally structured are confined
within distinct domestic pohtical systems. This makes a unified
human dialogue on issues of shared concern impossible. j\J1d
transnational remedies for perceived injustices are not available.
In a globalizing world it is crucial to encourage debate and
discussion of global issues that builds consensus, acknowledges
grievances, and identifies cleavages in a manner that is not
dominated by the borders of sovereign territorial states, or even
by innovative regional frames of reference as in Europe . .As a
consequence of this existing pattern of fragmentation in the
political order, societies and cultures develop their own distinctive
and generally self-serving distortions and myths, or perhaps, at
the very least, experience exaggerated differences of percepti~11
that feed pre-existing patterns of conflict. Most persons ;0th 111
one society have little difficulty ident.ifying the distorted perceptions of others, but tend to be oblivious to their own biases, t\11
insensitivity nurtured by mainstream media especially in the midsl
of major crises. The oft heard American response to the September 11 attacks, 'Why do they hate us so?' and the seething anger
in the Muslim world that has risen to the surface in the aftermath
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of the attacks starkly demonstrate just how profound and tragic is
the perception gap for societies on both sides of this now crucial
civilizational and societal divide.
The establishment of a CPA provides one way to address
constructively this perception gap. Like all elected assemblies, a
GPA would be a forum engendering debate on the main global
controversies, especially as they affect the peoples of the world.
Because elected delegates would be responsive to their respective
constituencies, and because the media would cover proceedings,
this debate would likely exert an influence far beyond the parliamentary chambers. Its echoes would be heard on editorial pages,
listservs, and TV, in schools and churches, and in assorted discussions at all levels of social interaction around the world. Spokespersons directly connected to aggrieved groups of citizens would
have a new transnational public arena to voice their opinions and
grievances, as well as to encounter opposed views. Those attacked
or criticized would have ample opportunity to defend themselves
and express their counter-claims. From such exchanges would
come the same pull toward a less confrontational understanding
between diverse groups of citizens that we find within the more
successful domestic democratic systems of the world. Of course,
complete agreement would never be ach ieved and is not even a
worthy goal. Conformity of outlook is never healthy for a political
community, but it is especially inappropriate in a global setting,
given the unevenness of economic and cultural circumstances
that exist. in the world. But a CPA process could at least greatly
faCilitate convergent perceptions of reality, thereby making controversies about problems and solutions more likely to be productive, including a mutual appreciation and acceptance of
differences in values, priorities and situations.
In addition to helping reduce the perception gap as an underlying cause of social tensions, a CPA would further promote the
peaceful resolution of enduring socia l tensions by encouraging
reliance on procedures for reaching decisions based 011 compromise and accommodation. Even where mutually acceptable solutions are not immediately achievable, parliamentary systems of
lawmaking and communication, if functioning well, at least provide a civil forum where adversaries can peacefully debate and
clarify their differences. If such institutions generate community
respect and gain legitimacy, then those who do not get their way
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on a particular issue will be generally far more inclined to accept
defeat out of a belief in the fairness of the process and with an
understanding that they can continue to press their case in the
future.
Of course, the brand of Muslim fundamentalism embraced by
Osama bin Laden is illiberal and anti-democratic in the extreme.
Given the existence of such extremism, it is appropriate to
question the ability of liberal democratic institutions to absorb
successfully those who share the worldview of al Qaeda, or adhere
to similar orientations. One of the impressive features of liberal
parliamentary process, however, is its considerable ability to assimilate many of those who do reject its democratic outlook. Because
parliamentary process invites participation and because it has the
politically powerful capacity to confer or deny the imprimatur of
popular legitimacy upon a political position, experience at the
domestic level suggests that even those with radical political
agendas will seldom decline the opportunity to participate. In the
United States, for example, those on the Christian right who have
deep religious doubts about the validity of secular political institutions have not only participated in the parliamentary process,
but have done so at times with zeal, tactical ingenuity, and
considerable success despite their minority status. In other
countries, small political parties at the ' margins of public opinion
often exert disproportionate influence in situations where a
majority position is difficult for dominant parties to achieve. By
participating in the process they have come to accept, at least in
practice, the legitimacy of these institutions and procedures for
societal decision-making.
Somewhat analogously, in the Cold War era the orthodoX
Soviet-inspired critique of the American system nominally
accepted by those American Communists represented by the
Communist Workers Party included a rejection of 'bourgeois'
rights in favour of what was then identified as 'the dictatorship of
the proletariat'. Yet, despite their professed rejection of 'bourgeois democracy', their leader Gus Hall ran for President of the
United States repeatedly in an attempt to gain a tiny bit of
electoral legitimacy for his position of isolation at the outermost
reaches of public opinion. The relative domestic openness of the
American political process helps explains why the United StateS
has suffered relatively little indigenous political violence in the
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twentieth century. During the period of heightened political
tensions in the 1960s, groups committed to violence such as the
Weather Underground, unlike al Qaeda today, could not attract
Popular support for their radical rejection of the American governing process, and never became more than a nuisance, posing
Only the most tangential threat to the security, much less the
Stability, of the country. This lack of societal resonance soon leads
to the decay, demoralization and collapse of such extremist
groups, a dynamic of rejection that is far more effective in
prOtecting society than law enforcement is even if enhanced by
emergency powers as is the case in wartime conditions. To a lesser
e~tent, the same self-destruct process seems to have kept the
rIght-Wing militia movement from posing a major threat to civic
order, although it was indirectly responsible for inspiring the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. This phenomenon with variations
can be observed within all of the more democratic systems of the
world. The Osama bin Ladens of tl1e planet would be highly
unlikely themselves to participate in a global parliamentary process, but their likely ability to attract any significant following
wOuld be substantially undermined to the extent that such an
Institution existed and gave the most disadvantaged and aggrieved
Peoples in the world a sense tl1at their concerns were being
tn.eaningfully addressed. Indeed, if such a safety valve existed, it
tn.'
Ight prevent, or at least discourage, tl1e emergence of the
Osalha syndrome, that the only way to challenge the existing
a:rangement of power and influence is by engaging in totalizing
VIolence against its civilian infrastructure.

Civic activism: setting the stage for a GPA
We believe that the underlying preconditions for a CPA are being
created by the way that civic politics is increasingly challenging the
aUtonomy of the state-centric international system. In one of the
tn.O St Significant, if still under-recognized, developments of the last
~evera~ years, both civic voluntary organizations and business and
nannal elites are engaged in creating parallel structures that
clomplement and erode the traditionally exclusive role of states as
t 1e only legitimate actors in the global political system. Individuals
and groups, and their numerous transnational associations, rising
up from and challenging the confines of territorial states, are

l
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promoting 'globalization-from-below', and have begun to coalesce
into what is now recognized as being a rudimentary 'global civil
society'. Business and financial elites, on their side, acting largely
to facilitate economic globalization, have launched a variety of
mechanisms to promote their own preferred global policy initiatives, a process that can be described as 'globalization-from-abo ve '.
While these new developments are rendering the territorial sovereignty paradigm partially anachronistic, they are still very far from
supplanting the old order, or even providing a design for a
coherent democratic system of representation that operates on a
truly global scale. Until the international community creates such
a representative structure, the ongoing tension between the democratic ideal and the global reality will remain unresolved. And we
will continue to be plagued by an incoherent global political
structure in which the peoples of the world are not offered the sort
of democratic alternative to violence that is increasingly considered
the sine qua non of legitimate domestic governance.

The organizations of global civil society
Is this coalescence of personal initiatives wit.h an array of transnational initiatives that we identify as global civil society capable of
mounting a transformative challenge to the customary role of
states as the representatives of their citizens in the international
system? Civil society, roughly defined as the politically organized
citizenry, is mostly decentralized, broken down into non-profit
organizations and voluntary associations dedicated to a wide
variety of mostly liberal, humanitarian and social causes (though
some decidedly illiberal and anti-liberal, of which terrorist and
criminal networks are the worrisome instance). TransnationaJly,
the largest and most prominent of tl1ese organizations bear such
respected names as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfarn,
and tlle International Committee of the Red Cross. There
are now more than 3,000 civil society organizations either
granted consultative status by the United Nations Economic an.d
Social Councilor associated with the UN Department of publl e
Information.
As described by Jessica Mathews in her landmark 1997 article
in FOTeign Affairs,S global civil society gained significantly in influence during the second half, and particularly the last quarter, of
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the twentieth century. The early 1990s, however, was the time
when civic transnationalism really came of age. If any single
occasion deserves to be identified with the emergence of civil
society on the global scene it would probably be the June 1992
DN Conference on the Environment. and Development held in
Rio de Janeiro. More than 1,500 civil society organizations were
accrf'dited to participate and 25,000 individuals from around the
world took part in parallel NCO forums and activitie. Civic
associations and their representatives were for the first time
recognized as an imponant and independent presence at a major
World inter-governmental conference. The Rio Conference, partly
responsive to this active involvement of global civil society, produced four major policy-making instruments:]
Mter Rio the pattern intensified. In the first half of the 1990s
there were several other major global conferences under UN
auspices at which civil society participation was an important
factor. The most significant of these dealt with human rights
(Vienna 1993), population (Cairo 1994), and women (Beijing
1995) . The democratizing success ofthese global events produced
a backlash among several major governments, especially the
United States. The result in the hort term has been the virtual
abandonment of such conferences by the United Nations, supposedly for fiscal reasons, but actually because governments were
afraid of losing some of their control over global policy-making.
With the exception of tlle racism conference in Durban, South
Mrica, during 2001, there has been no major conference of this
SOrt in the new millennium. It is important to evaluate this
experience in the setting of the quest. for global democracy.
There is little doubt that these conferences in the 1990s did a
great deal to establish the role and presence of civil society as a
Significant player in the global arena.
When the 1990s came to an end, the decade's balance sheet of
accomplishments reflected for the first time in history the impact
of global civil society. These transnational forces had been instrumental in promoting treaties to deal with global warming, establish an international criminal court and outlaw anti-personnel
landmin es. These same actors were also influential during these
years in persuading the International Court. of Justice to render
an Advisory Opinion on the legali ty of nuclear weapons and in
defeating an OECD attempt to gain acceptance for a multilateral
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investment agreement. This global populist movement at the turn
of the millennium gained widespread attention through its advocacy of the cancellation of the foreign debts of the world's poorest
coun tries. While all of these efforts to a greater or lesser extent
remain works-in-progress, civil society has clearly been indispensable in achieving current levels of success.
During the formative years of the 1990s the most visible
gatherings of civil society organizations took place beneath the
shadow of large multilateral conferences of states. As the decade
drew to a close, and with these conferences, at least in the near
term, mostly foreclosed, something different began to occur. The
multitude of global civil society organizations began to act on
their own, admittedly in an exploratory and highly uncertain
fashion, and yet independently of states and international institutions . For instance, in May 1999 at The Hague Appeal for
Peace, 8,000 individuals, mostly representing civil society organizations from around the world, and given heart by the presence
of such luminaries as Nobel Peace Laureates Archbishop Desmond Tutu,Jose Ramos-Horta, and Jody Williams, met to shape a
strategy for the future and to agree on a common agenda.
Throughout the fo llowing year there were similar though smaller
meetings in Seoul, Montreal, Germany, and elsewhere.
These meetings were a prelude to the Millennium NGO Forum
held at tl1e UN in May 2000 at the initiative of UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan. It was an expression of his 'partnership
policy' to reach out to non-state actors of both a civic and a
market character. The Secretary-General invited some 1,400 individuals from international civil society to UN Headquarters in
New York to present their views on global issues and to debate an
organizational structure that might enable the peoples of the
world to participate effectively in global decision-making. That
UN Millennium Forum agreed to establish a permanenuy constituted assembly of civil society organizations call ed t.he Civil Society
Forum that is mandated to meet at least every two to three years,
scheduled so as to precede the annual sessions of the UN General
Assembly. While progress has been uneven, civil society has been
continuing to work in the face of statist resistance and skepticism
to bring th is forum into fruition.
Many activi LS wiLhin global civil society regard this UN millennial initiative as the first step toward the establishment of a
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popular assembly that would meet at regular intervals, if not on a
continuous basis. The emergence of such a Civil Society Forum
might over time come to be recognized as an important barometer of world public opinion, and significantly, from the
perspective of this chapter, could be seen as a preliminary, yet
significant, step on the path to the establishment of a CPA.

The global business elite at Davos
Complicating, yet undeniably crucial to the dynamics of global
democratization, are the efforts of business and finance to
reshape tl1e international order to render the global marketplace more amenable to the expansion of trade and investment.
Transnational business and financial elites have so far clearly
been more successful tl1an civil society. Through their informal
networks and their stature in society, financial and business elites
often blend seamlessly with national and international structures
of governance. State emissaries to the international system are
frequently chosen directly from their ranks, and the acceptance of the neo-liberal economic ideology as tantamount to the
official ideology not only of international economic institutions,
but of other international organizations and most governments,
has given business and banking leaders an extraordinary influence on global policy. Even in formerly exclusive arenas of state
action, these private sector actors are flexing their muscles. As
an indication of this expanding international influence, by
bringing business and banking officials into United Nations
policy-making circles for the first time, the UN Secretary-General
has made 'partnering' with the business community a major
hallmark of his leadership. The United Nations has now established a formal business advisory counci l that is meant to institutionalize a permanent relationship between the business
community and the UN, as well as initiated a 'Global Compact' in
which major multinationals sign on to a set of guidelines that
commits them to uphold international standards pertaining to
environment, human rights and labour practices in exchange for
being given what amounts to a UN stamp of approval for their
conduct.
As with civic groups, elite business participation in this emerg-
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ing globalism is in the process of transforming itself into an
informal institutional structure that indirectly challenges the statist paradigm. The best example of the ability of elite business
networks to extend their influence into the international system
has been the World Economic Forum that ha been meeting
annually in Davos, Switzerland. The WEF was begun modesrly
three decades ago by the Swiss business visionary, Klaus Schwab.
During its early years the WEF concentrated its efforts primarily
on rather humdrum management issues. In the early 19805,
however, it succeeded in transforming itself into a political forum.
In many ways Davos as we know it today is the legacy of earlier
attempts to create transnational networks tasked with joining
together international corporate and policy-making elites. Most
observers agree that the most prominent of these precursors to
the WEF was the highly secretive Bilderberg Conferences. Also
important was David Rockefeller's Trilateral Commission (which
also began in the 1970s, with an immediate display of influence
on the highest levels of governmental decision-making in the
industrial countries of the North before largely fading out of
sight, in large part because Western governments adopted and
acted upon its policy agenda). In terms of sheer concenrration of
super-elites from around the world, however, there has never
been anything approaching the scale and salience that has been
achieved by Davos over the course of the late 1990s. Annually,
1,000 of the world's most powerful executives and another 1,000
of the world's senior policy-makers participate in a week of
roundtables, discussions, lectures and presentations by world
leaders.
But Davos has become much more than an assemblage of the
rich and famous, although it is far less menacing and conspiratorial than its most severe critics allege, and it espouses no
grandiose project that seeks to rule the world. At the same time,
its advocates often make claims that stretch the reality of its
considerable influence beyond the point of credibility. The WEF
provides flexible arenas for discussion and recommendation that
give its membership the ability to shape global policy on a
continuous and effective basis. It is notable ,-hat the UN SecretaryGeneral's ideas about a partnership with business and civil society
have been put forwal-d as proposals during several high-profile
appearances by Kofi Annan at Davos. In addition to encouraging
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the development of its own well-articulated approaches to global
problems on the basis of neo-liberal precepts, the WEF conducts
and disseminates its own research, which not surprisingly exhibits
a consistent economistic outlook that portrays the future as
market-driven. The WEF produces an annual index ranking the
relative economic competitiveness of all countries in the world,
which is given substantial media attention at the time or release
each year.
There is no objective way to gauge the extent of influence
exerted by Davos. Its own claims as a l'acililator of conflict
resolution are often not convincing. For example, the WEF takes
credit for facilitating early meetings between the apartheid regime
and the ANC, and for bringing Israeli Prime Minister Shimon
Peres and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat together in 1992, where
they purportedly reached a preliminary agreement on Palestinian
administration of Gaza and Jericho. The WEF is far more discreet
about claiming any direct influence on global social and econ?mic policy, being sensitive to accusations of back channel lobbyIng on behalf of transnational corporate interests. If the focus is
placed on global economic policy then Davos together with other
overlapping networks of corporate elites, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce, seems to have been remarkably successful up to this time in shaping the global policy setting in direclions to its liking. This success is illustrated by the expansion of
international trade regimes, trends toward privatization, the maintenance of modest regulation of capital markets, the credibility
aCcorded only to a neo-liberal interpretation of state/market
relations, and the supportive collaboration of most governments,
especially those in the North.
All in all the WEF has managed to position itself so as to
provide a vital arena of inquiry and decision during t.his early
stage of economic globalization. Such positioning has reduced
the significance of democratic forces operating within states in
relation to foreign economic policy, which in turn strengthens
the argument to provide opportunities for civic participation in
transnational institutional settings that will offset the impact of
the multinational corporate arenas and give more voice to grassroots and populist concerns. Again, the focus on this dynamic is
likely to be lost in the short-term aftermath of the September 11
attacks, which has temporarily restored the state as guardian of
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security to its traditional pre-eminence. Underlying globalizing
trends are likely with the passage of time, however, to reassert the
significance of establishing the structures of global governance in
forms that take into account the goals of both market and
transnational civic forces.

A GPA as the logical outcome of the process of global
democratization
Putting aside the backlash against the global conference format,
it seems reasonable to suggest that the international system is now
exhibiting greater participation by non-state actors than ever
before in its history. Without question, global civil society is
unable to equal the influence, resources and power linkages of
the corporate and banking communities. Nevertheless, relying on
imagination and information, many of these civic networks have
found ways to carve out a niche within the international order
that enables effective pressures to be mounted. At the same time,
there are many shortcomings of such an ad hoc and improvised
approach to global democracy. This transformation of the international system has been occurring in a largely uncoordinated
and uneven fashion that further tends to disadvantage the concerns of the weakest and poorest. This obscures the need to
connect these two types of globalizing networks (from above,
from below) in a manner that is coherent, fair and efficient from
the perspective of global governance.
In effect, what we have at present is a partial transplant from
domestic political systems where interest group pluralism flourishes within an overarching representative structure of parliamentary decision-making. At the global level we currently have
rudimentary interest group pluralism, but it is deficient in several
respects. There is a lack of accountability due to the absence of a
representative structure and a low quality of functionality as a
result of statist unwillingness to provide institutional capabilities
for transnational political life. We believe this to be an inherently
unsustainable path to a more evolved global system that is
humane and comes to approximate a democratic model. What is
notably missing from these intersecting forms of transnationalism
is some type of unifying parliamentary body that can represent
general as well as special interests.
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The prevailing understanding of democracy today rejecLS the
view that organized interest groups can validly claim to represent
society as a whole. As global civil society has become morc of an
international presence, those opposing its agenda and activism
have already begun to ask upon what basis are those wiLhin it
entitled to represem the peoples of the world. Awkward questions
are asked: 'Who other than themselves do civil society organizations speak for?' 'Who elected them?' 'To whom are they accountable for their actions?' As global civil society becomes more
influential, and as more ideologically diverse and antagonistic
groups such as, for examp le, the American National Rifle Association, or for thaL matter Islamic fundamentalist organizations,
clamour for access to global arenas of decision, this problem of
representation can only become more complex and ever more
hotly contested.
This illegitimacy charge can be equally levelled at the Davos
improvisation, which, unlike civil society, does not even possess
that degree of representativeness that comes from having within
its ranks large membership organizations. Certainly those citizens
who oppose mainstream globalization regard the Davos model of
elite politics to be extremely suspect. Such an assessment of these
transnational developments suggests that the kinds of opening of
the international system that have been occurring do not satisfy
the demand for democratic participation. Something more is
needed. Some sort of popular assembly capable of more systematically representing the diverse peoples of the world is necessary if
the democratic deficit is to be meaningfully reduced. To the
extent that the global undertakings are criticized for their failure
to measure up to modern democratic standards, then world order
seems ever more vulnerable to the charge of being more of an
insiders' game than all but the most corrupt and draconian
domestic political systems. Even before the events of September
11 it was evident that those whose interests were not being
addressed, were unwilling to accept the legitimacy of existing
global arrangements. It seems likely that given the continuation
of these conditions, that the democratic deficit will grow even
larger, leading to the further proliferation of various types of
severe instability, which are currently causing such widespread
turmoil and suffering in the world system.
The absence of a unifying parliamentary structure also means
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that there is currently no institutional vessel capable of bringing
together the organized groupings of transnational activism that
are identified with civil society alld the Davos constituencies so a
to facilitate dialogue, and the search for compromises and accommodations. As matters now stand, only governments have the
institutional capacity to find such common ground and strike
deals. As we discussed previously, there is no process for individuals and groups themselves to create a social consensus acros
borders or to engage formally with those acting on behalf of
market forces. To the extent that solu tions to globaJ problems
can be arrived at within a structure that institutionalizes interaction and allows for direct communication among competing
interests, such interests will be much more likely to accep t as
legitimate, policy outcomes U1at have been fairly negotiated and
agreed upon.

A GPA as a practical political project
We believe that the establishment of some sort of parliamentary
assembly is necessary to begin to deal seriously with the democratic deficit.. At the same time we realize that scepticism is
rampant: is the creation of such a global assembly politically
possibJe at this stage of history? For a variety of reasons, we believe
that it is not Panglossian to believe it possible for the global
community to take this vital step in building global democracy.
Mter all, empirically suggesting the viability of such a project is
the European Union, which has been making impressive attempts
to overcome a purported regional democratic deficit. The EU
already possesses a transnationally elected legislative body, the
European Parliament. The European Parliament, along with the
European Council and the European Commission, is one of three
legislative bodies operating within the framework of the European
Union. As we would expect to be the case with a globally elected
assembly, the Parliament has struggled to establish credibility over
time in the face of statist scepticism and media scorn. In recent
years, however, the European Parliament has fll1ally begun to
gain respect, and has started to exercise significant power. Europe
is, of course, far more homogeneous and economically integrated
than the world at large, and the establishment of the Parliament
was a part of a broader movement toward regional unity. At the
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same time this European evolution shows that there are no
~bsolute political or logistical barriers to the creation and functJ.oning of such an assembly on a transnational scale, and further,
that such a development is fully compatible with the persistence
of strong states and robust nationalist sentiments. In fact, on a
global level, those with a pronounced interest in global governance - civil society, the corporate elite, and many governments
- have an individual as well as collective stake in erecting some
type of overarching democratic structure.

The role of civil society
Certain sector·s of civil society in particular could likely be, and in
fact are being, mobilized to lead the drive for such an assembly.5
This is import.ant, because while there is the potential to find
some support from corporate and political elites, it is unrealistic
to expect the main initiative to come from these sectors. Most of
the individuals leading business and governmental organizations
tend to be institutionally conservative, as well as often too closely
linked to state structures to support such a bold initiative. For
these reasons, the primary energy for a global parliament will
come from civil society, or nowhere.
It is rather obvious, however, that not even all civil society
organizations are in favour of the creation of such an assembly.
Some evidently sense tl1at their influence would shrink in an
altered world order. Nevert.heless, the sentiments throughout
global civil society are overwhelmingly in favour of establishing
institutions and practices that will enable global democracy to
flourish in the years ahead. Within this broader consensus there
exists a realization that the creation of a functioning global
parliament or assembly is a necessary and desirable step. The
appeal of the GPA proposal to advance the agenda of global civil
society seems rather obvious. At a general level, a democratically
constituted assembly would be likely to address widespread societal concerns about the undemocratic nature of existing international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. It would
almost certainly encourage furtl1er democratizing global reforms,
as well as provide a setting for debates about the positive and
negative effects of globalization. There would for the first time a
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widely recognized global forum in which such mallers of public
be concern as environmental quality, labour standards, and ecoOomic justice could be discussed from a variet)' of perspectives,
including encounters between civil society representatives from
North and South who set forth contrasting concerns embodyiog
differing priorities. The presence of democratic structures does
not, of course, guarantee that participants will consistently behave
responsibly. We have learned from experience that even tlle most
experienced and respected legislative institutions witl1in states can
act in an erratic fashion from time to time that does not reflect
me real interests or values of constituents, but such is the cost
incurred to sustain democratic processes as me basis of
governance .
Even an initially weak and controversial global assembly could
at least provide the beginnings of democratic oversight and
accountability for the international system. The fact that individuals from many parts of me world would directly participate in
elections would likely lead me assembly to have an impressive
grassroots profile mat would lend a certain populist authenticity
to its pronouncements and recommendations. In all probability,
at first, most governments would refuse to defer to such an
assembly that operated beyond meir control, but such rejectionist
attitudes would be unlikely to persist very long. Mter all, we are
living at a time when democracy has increasingly become the sine
qua non of legitimacy around the world and the assembly would
be the only institution that could validly claim to represent the
peoples of global societ)' directly. The comparison of its views with
those of governments and market-dominated forums would likely
attract media attention before long; becoming a part of public
discourse would in turn influence the course of civil-political
decision-making.
Besides exercising a democratic influence on the formulation
of social policy, such an assembly could also be instrumental in
helping to encourage compliance with international norms and
standards, especially in the realm of widely supported human
rights. Currently, the international system generally lacks reliable
mechanisms to implement many of its laws. Civil society organizations such as Amnest)' International, and even international
organizations such as the International Labor Organization and
the UN Human Rights Commission, attempt to address this
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d~ficiency and exert significant pressure on states by exposing
failures of compliance by states, relying on a process that is often
referred to as the 'mobilization of shame'. This pressure is
premised on the importance to governments of sustaining their
reputation for acting in conformity with normative standards and
the reliability of established NGOs in identifying patterns of
abusive behaviour. In contributing to such an oversight function,
a popularly elected GPA would likely soon become more visible
and credible than are existing informal watchdogs that seek to
expose corporate and governmental wrongdoing, and in any
event, would complement such activism. A GPA would also tend
to be less deferential to leading sovereign states than the more
official watchdogs that function within the essentially statist framework of the United Nations System.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the mere existence and availability of the assembly would likely be helpful in promoting the
peaceful resolution of international conflicts. We have already
discussed how a GPA might be useful in undermining wider
circles of societal support for international terrorism as a form of
non-state violence. It could also in time help to reduce the
likelihood of interstate violence as well. Instead of representing
states, as in the United Nations and other established international organizations, delegates would directly represent various
constituencies with societal roots. This means that, unlike the
present system, the assembly would not be designed to reinforce
artificially constructed 'national interests' or to promote the
special projects of rich and influential elites. Rather, as in multinational societies such as India or Switzerland, or in the European
Parliament, most elected delegates do not consistently or mechanically vote along national lines, except possibly in instances where
their national origins are directly engaged with the issue in
dispute. Coalitions form in these settings on other bases, such as
worldview, political orientation, class and racial solidarities, and
ethical affinities. The experience of engaging in a democratic
process to reach legislative compromises on the part of antagonists that are organized as opposing, but non-militarized and
often shifting, coalitions may over time help establish a culture of
peace. It is perhaps too optimistic to think that such a learning
curve might eventually undermine reliance on the present war
system to sustain national and global security. It is difficult to
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transform the militarist mentalities associated with the pursuit of
security in a world that continues to be organized around the
prerogatives of sovereign national units that are heavily armed
and disposed to destroy one another if the need arises. The
hope is that over time the organization of international relations
would come more closely to resemble decision-making within the
most democratic societies of the world. Not only would an assembly tend to oppose military establishments as d1e foundation of
global security, but it is also likely to build confidence in the
perspectives of human security and in the efficacy of peaceful
approaches to world order. Only when enough people begin
someday to feel that non-violent structures of governance, including law enforcement, can ensure their individual and collective
survival will meaningful disarmament become a genuine political
option.
Any proposed institution that can credibly claim a potential for
advancing causes as central to the agenda of various global civil
society organizations as global democratization, labour and
environmental regulation, effective global governance, peace, and
human rights obviously should possess the capacity t.o generate
broad-based support within civil society. So far, however, the
nascent civil society movement that favours the establishment of
such an assembly remains separate and distinct. It has not managed to gain significant levels of support, or even interest, from
the issue-oriented actors that have so far been the main architects
of global civil society. The present movement for an assembly
consists mainly of individuals and groups who believe in holistic
solutions to global problems, and seek to promote humane global
governance for the world. Such proponents of a GPA are culturally influenced by a range of contemporary traditions of thought
and modalities of action as varied as ecology, religion, spirituality,
humanism and, most recendy of all, the Internet. Each of these
orientations proceeds from a premise of human solidarity and a
belief in the essential unity of planet earth. Significant organizing
efforts associated either with building support for the GPA or
experimenting with its local enactment are under way in many
different places around t.he world. This is an exciting development. It portends the possibility that from within civil society a
truly innovative and visionary politics is beginning to take shape
after centuries of dormancy. Such movement is an expression of
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the in

.
creasmg robustness of democratic values as the foundation
for. all forms of political legitimacy regardless of the scale of the
UnIt of social action being appraised. Also relevant are many types
of transnational connectivity that manifest the globalizing ethos
of OUr twenty-first-century world.

The receptivity of the business elite to a GPA
The global outlook of tl1e corporate and financial elites represented at Davos, and elsewhere is also relevant to tl1e prospects
f?r furthering the cause of a GPA. The Davos network has been
Smgularly Successful in marshalling support for new international
regimes iliat promote its interests in an open global economy.
The World Trade Organization and NAFTA are two obvious
examples. Certainly some within its ranks will oppose a new
global parliamentary institution because a more open political
~ystem would mean a broader decision-making base, a questionLng of the distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic
growth, and more pressure for transnational regulation of market forces. Such developments would almost certainly be viewed
with suspicion, if not hostility, by those who meet regularly at
Davos to construct a world economy that is committed to the
'efficient' use of capital, and dubious about any incorporation of
social and normative goals into ilie formation of world economic
policy. It would almost certainly be the case that such an assembly, if reflective of grassroots opinion around the world, would
be highly critical of current modes of globalization, and hence
at odds witl1 the outcomes sought by the Davos leadership. But
with transnational corporations having been, and in all likelihood continuing to be, beneficiaries of this globalization-fromabove, those in the business world with a more enlightened sense
of their long-term interest are already coming to believe that the
democratic deficit must be addressed by way of stakeholder
accommodations. It is perhaps relevant to recall that although
hostile at first, many members of the American managerial class
came under tl1e pressure of the Great Depression and its societal
unrest to realize that the New Deal was a necessary dynamic of
adjustment to the claims of workers and the poor during a crisis
time for capitalism. The same kind of dynamic made social
democracy acceptable to the business/financial leadership of
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leading European countries, and helped give capitalism a more
human face that enhanced its legitimacy at the level of society.
In a similar vein, many of the leading figures in world business
seem to find congenial the idea that some sort of democratizing
improvisation along the lines we are suggesting is necessary to
make globalization politically acceptable to more of the peoples
of the world.
As the large street protests of the last few years in various places
around the world suggested to many observers, globalization has
not yet managed to achieve grassroots acceptance and societal
legitimacy. Lori Wallach (the prime organizer of the Seattle antiWTO demonstrations) said in an interview tl1at her coalition of
so many diverse groups, in addition to battling a series of distinct
social issues, was held t.ogether by the 'notion that the democracy
deficit in the global economy is neither necessary nor
acceptable' .6
In fact, the main basis of popular support for globalization at
present is not political, but economic. Globalization has eitl1er
been able to deliver or to hold out tl1e promise of delivering we
economic goods to enough people to keep the anti-globalization
forces from gaining sufficient ground to mount an effective
challenge against it. Economic legitimacy alone is rarely able to
stabilize a political system for long. Market-based economic systems have h istorically undergone ups and downs, particularly
when they are in formation. The emerging-markets financial crisis
that almost triggered a world financial meltdown in 1997 will
surely not be the last crisis to emerge from the current modalities
of globalization. Future economic failures are certain to generate
strong and contradictory political responses . We know that standing in the wings, not only in the United States but in several other
countries, are poli ticians, ultra-nationalists, and an array of opportunists on both the left and the right who, if given an opening,
would seek to d ismantle the system so as to restore territorial
sovereignty, and with it, nationalism and protectionism. If the
globalizing elite is seeking to find a political base that will allow it
to survive economic downturns, particularly in the event that
economic and social forces in powerful countries are in the future
adversely affected, then it would do well to turn its attention
urgently to reducing the global democratic deficit. Global terror
plays a diversionary role at present, especially in the United States,
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but this disu'action from the imperatives of global reform are not
likely to persist, especially in the face of widespread economic
hardship and distress.
There is a lesson to be learned from Suharto's Indonesia that
offers some striking parallels to the vulnerabilities of the current
global system. Indonesian citizens had come to believe in democratic practices, but the political system remained largely authoritarian, and unresponsive to the concerns of the people. As long
as Indonesia was both a Cold War ally of the West and enjoyed
the dramatic economic growth rates that had been sustained for
nearly 30 years, American support was solid and there were
enough benefits for most of the population to control political
restiveness in a country with many acute ethnic and regional
tensions. The great majority of the Indonesian people seemed
either intimidated or willing to tolerate the country's failure to
live up to the democratic ideal. But when the economy found
itself in serious trouble during the last months of 1997, President
Suharto had little to fall back upon internally or externally to
maintain the political allegiance of the citizenry and his political
edifice, which had seemed so formidable just months earlier. The
Jakarta regime rapidly crumbled around him. The latent political
illegitimacy of the Java-centric Indonesian government became a
destabilizing factor that accompanied and intensified the economic and ethnic tribulations of the country.

The receptivity of the political elite to a GPA
Portions of the corporate elite might be persuaded that it is in
their interest to support a GPA. Would not those who control
state power, however, be less likely to go along with such an
innovation? Surely any public institution that could reduce the
global democratic deficit by claiming to speak directly for global
society could eventually become an important counterweight to
state and market power. The important word here is eventually.
A relatively weak assembly constituted initially mainly with advisory powers would begin to address concerns about the democratic deficit while posing only a long-term threat to the citadels
of state power. This being the case national leaders, whose
concerns tend to be associated with short-term prerogatives, have
little reason to feel significantly challenged by the establishment
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of such an assembly. Systemic transformation of world order that
could affect successors would not to be threatening to, and might
in fact appeal to those political leaders who are themselves most
inclined to extend democratic ideals to all arenas of authority
and decision.
Putting in place a minimally empowered, but politically saleable institutional structure that nonetheless has far-reaching transformative potential is, in fact, an approach often adopted by the
most effective advocates of new global institl.ltions. What has
become the European Union, for example, began after the
Second World War as the European Coal and Steel Community,
a modest, skeletal framework for what would decades later evolve
into an integrated European political structure that more recently
poses some serious challenges to the primacy of the European
state. The French Declaration of 9 May 1950 initially proposing
the European Coal and Steel Community makes clear that this
humble beginning was by design:
Europe will not be made all aL once, or according LO a single plan.
[The French Government) proposes that Franco-German production
of coal and sLeel as a whole be placed under a common High
Au thoriLy, within the framework of an organization open to the
participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal
and steel production should immedialely provide [or the selting up of
common foundations [or economic developmenl as a first step in the
federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of Lhose regions
which have long been devoled to the manufacture of munitions of
war, of which they have been the most constant of victims .'

Within the European Un ion, by far the best model for a
globally representative assembly, the European Parliament started
life as an institutional vessel largely devoid of formal powers.
Through time, as the sale direct representative of tl1e European
citizenry, me Parliament began to acquire an important. institutional role that has given vit.ality to the undertaking, as well as
increasingly reinforcing the European will to carry on witl1 their
bold experiment in regional governance.
One source of optimism that many national leaders can be
persuaded to support mis assembly project arises from the recent
experience of building a coalition to push for the establishment
of a permanent International Criminal Court. A large number of
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civil society organizations, working in collaboration with governments, have been very effective, at least" so far,s in building widespread cooperation among political elites around the world Oll
behalf of a project that only a decade earlier had been dismissed
as utopian. The willingness of political leaders to support the
creation of such a tribunal is quite surprising. It also lends indirect
encouragement to efforts to establish a GPA because the criminal
COUrt compromises traditional sovereign prerogatives far more
than would be the case initially if a globa l parliament comes into
existence. The court has the substan tive power to prosecute individuals for their failure to comply with international criminal law,
which means that states have lost exclusive control over the application of penal law, which had been regarded as one of the
traditional and fundamenta l attributes of sovereignty. Government
leaders have lost their immunity to some extent in relation to
international standards. By comparison a parliament with largely
advisory powers would appear to be a relatively modest concession
to the growing demand for a more democratic and legitimate
global order, and would initially not sigllificantly impinge upon
the exercise of sovereign powers of a state. Of course, the idea of a
parallel international law-making body, even if advisory, does raise
the possibility in the moral and political imagination, that more
centralization of authority is necessary and desirable, and this
possibility, however remote, is likely to be threatening to governments administering nation-states.

Realizing the vision
While the rationale for establishing such an assembly definitely
exists, this is, of course, not enough. There needs to be some
viable way for this potential to be realized. We believe the formula
with the best ability to take advantage of the political promise we
have identified can be found in what is being called the 'New
Diplomacy'. Unlike traditional diplomacy, which is solely conducted among states, the New Diplomacy is based on the Collaboration of civil society with whatever s~tes ar~ .receptive, allOwing
the formation of flexible and innovative coahtions that shift from
issue to issue and over time. The major success stories of global
civil society in the 1990s were produced in this manner including
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the Global Warming Treaty, the Landmines Convention and the
International Criminal Court.
This New Diplomacy (if it is to continue into this new century)
is well adapted to meeting the challenge of creating a globally
elected assembly. Nevertheless, the seemingly most natural way to
bring a new international regime into being, a large-scale multilateral conference, does not appear well suited to this project.
Despite the receptivity of some political elites, there is unlikely to
be a critical mass of states in the UN General Assembly or outside
its confines that would be willing to call for the convocation of
such a conference. We believe that the momentum that would
lead to significant state support for the assembly would undoubtedly have to be developed indirectly and gradually. Two other
possible approaches seem worth considering in relation to bringing the GPA into being.
One approach that we discuss in more detail in the Summer
2000 edition of the Sta,nfordJournal of International Law D would be
for civil society with the help of receptive states t.o proceed to
create the assembly without resorting to a formal treaty process.
Under this approach the assembly would not be formally sanCtioned by the collectivity of states and hence its legitimacy would
probably be contested by governments at the outset unless they
chose to ignore its existence altogether. This opposition could be
neutralized to some extent by widespread grassroots and media
endorsement, and by the citizenry as expressed through popular
elections that were taken seriously by large numbers of people
and were fairly administered.
The other approach is to rely on a treaty, but to utilize what is
often called the Single Negotiating Text Method as the process
for coming to an agreement on the specifics of an assembly
among supportive states. Pursuant to this approach after extensive
consultations with sympathetic parties from civil society, business
and nation-states, an organizing committee would generate the
text of a treaty establishing an assembly that could serve as the
basis for negotiations. Momentum could be generated as civil
society organized a public relations campaign and some states
were persuaded (sometimes as a result of agreed upon modifications in the draft) to accede to the treaty one at a time. As in the
Ottawa Process that ultimately led to the Landmines Convention,
a small core group of supportive states could lead the way. Unlike
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the Landmines treaty, however, which it was thought could not
m.eaningfully come into effect before forty countries ratified it, a
relatively small number of countries, say twenty, could provide
the founding basis to bring such an assembly into being. Though
this number is but a fraction of what would eventually be needed
If the assembly wished to have some claim to global democratic
legitimacy, it is worth remembering that the European Coal and
Steel Community, which evolved to become the European Union,
Started with only six countries. After all, once the assembly was
estab lish ed and functioning in an impressive way the task of
gaining additional state members should become easier. There
Would then exist a concrete organization to which states could
~Ctually be urged to join by their own citizens. As more states
JOined, pressure on the remaining states to allow their citizens to
VOte and participate would likely grow, especially if the assembly
bUilt a positive reputation in its early years. Holdout states would
:ncreasingly find themselves in the embarrassing position of being
In a dwindling minority of states denying their citizens the ability
to participate along with persons from foreign countries in the
World's only globally elected body. It would seem increasingly
perverse to proclaim democratic values at home but resist demoCratic practices and possibilities abroad. The exact nature of the
representative parliamentary stmcture that should or will be
created remains to be determined, and should be resolved
through vigorous discussion by many different actors drawn from
all corners of the world. What is clear to us, however, is that the
Ongoing phenomena of global democratization are part of an
:volutionary social process that will persist, and intensify. While it
IS still too early to determine the long-term implications of the
eVents of September 11, the future will surely find many ways to
rernind the peoples of the world that a commitment to global
dernocratic governance is a matter of urgency, and that a way to
Illove forward is through the establishment of a GPA.
Until the onset of the global terror challenge, the two dominant themes of the post-Cold War years were globalization and
~lernocracy. Proclamations are now commonplace that the world
IS rapidly creating an integrated global political economy and that
national governments that are not freely elected lack political
legitimacy. In view of this, it is paradoxical that there has not yet
been a serious global debate on concrete proposals to resolve the
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obvious contradiction between a professed commitment to
democracy at the level of the sovereign state and a manifestly
undemocratic global political-economic order. Perhaps this
apparent tension can be explained as a form of political inertia,
and possibly by the residual sense that such democratizing proposals are still per se utopian. Whatever the explanation. this
contradict.ion will not be tolerated for long. Citizen groups and
business and financial elites are Hot waiting around for governments to come up with solutions. They have taken direct aJ1d
concrete action to realize their aspirations. These initiatives have
created an autonomous dynamic resulting in spontaneous forms
of global democratization. As this process continues in an attempt
to keep pace with globalization, as it surely will, the movement
for a coherent and legitimate syst.em of global democracy will and
should intensify. To political elites it will continue to become
increasingly obvious that without legitimating institutions, governing the global order will be more difficult and contentious. TheY
are likely to be plagued by the growing disinclination of citizens
to accept the policy results of an ever-more encompassing systeJ11
that is not based on a recognizable form of legitimate governance.
To the organized networks of global civil society and business th.e
inclination, reinforced by t.he practice of democratic societies, 15
to find direct accommodations and to work out differences. Such
a process will naturally lead policy-makers to look toward familiar
democratic structures to bridge present, widening cleavages.
Finally, to all those who are seriously concerned abou t social
justice, and the creation of a more peaceful global order, tbe
democratic alternative to an inherently authoritarian global system will surely be ever more compelling.
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